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INTRODUCTION

As the Bush administration passes the half-way point of its first
term, analysts would agree that one of the most pressing domestic
problems on the national agenda is the savings and loan debacle.
Perhaps never again will the thrift industry, or for that matter the
banking industry generally, enjoy the public confidence that it did
prior to the crisis.
In this troubled time for lending institutions, additional unanticipated liability is almost certainly unwelcome. It is just such
surprise liability with which this article deals. This unexpected liability arises in the arena of Title 11 Bankruptcy.
If a lender finds itself in the following fact pattern, then a trap
is set and waiting to spring in the event of bankruptcy on the part
1025
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of the borrower.' It is a common scenario. A borrower approaches
a lender about a loan. For whatever reason, a loan is arranged
so that the borrower is required to have a guarantor but is otherwise unsecured. So the borrower gets as its guarantor an owner,
officer or family member of the borrower, depending on the type
of entity the borrower is. If a lender executes a loan under these
circumstances, and the borrower enters bankruptcy, the lender
could, because of the guarantee arrangement, find itself subject
to an unexpected recovery 2 by the trustee in bankruptcy for certain
payments made to the lender by the borrower. This fact pattern
and the difficulties it has produced will be referred to through the
remainder of this article as insider preference recovery against noninsider creditors.
It is a complicated construction of the Bankruptcy Code which
has brought about this complex problem. For the purposes of this
introduction, however, lenders in the above guarantee loan situation should pay close attention to this possible recovery. Since
many lawyers, even those well versed in these specific topics, never
expected the Bankruptcy Code to be interpreted in this way, the
lending institutions have been by and large equally unaware of this
potential recovery. Therein lies the surprise. Simply knowing of
the problem, its genesis, and the rationale behind decisions creating
it, can provide lenders the opportunity to avail themselves of means
by which the problem may be avoided. This Note is meant to be
an overview of this troubling puzzle.

1. For the purposes of this Note, the term borrower will be used interchangeably with
debtor, guarantor with insider, and lender with creditor. Each pair of terms represents the same

party in the transactions which will be discussed. Of course, in everyday business transactions,
these terms are not necessarily synonymous.
2. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988). Recovery of avoided preferences is one function
of the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding. For the uninitiated, a brief explanation of the bankruptcy process is warranted at this time. Once the debtor files for bankruptcy, a trustee is selected
to administer the estate of the debtor. If no trustee is appointed, the debtor may become a debtor
in possession and act as trustee. Once gathered, this estate is distributed to creditors according

to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The avoided transfers which will be mentioned throughout this Note are recovered and returned to the estate of the debtor.
3. See, e.g., in re Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr. 843, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
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INSIDER PREFERENCE RECOVERY AGAINST NON-INSIDER
CREDITORS

A.

Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions

Bankruptcy and other courts have woven together several Bankruptcy Code provisions to arrive at insider preference recovery
against non-insider creditors. To understand the problem, it is necessary to set forth the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions.
The Bankruptcy Code defines a creditor as "an entity that has
a claim 4 against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the

order for relief concerning the debtor

.

.. .5

When an insolvent debtor makes a payment to a creditor to
the detriment or exclusion of other creditors, the payment is known
6
as a preference.
One of the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy is that of avoidance. 7 Avoidance, in the context of this Note, means that the trustee may make void a transfer made from the debtor to a creditor
which is a preference. Section 547 of the Code outlines the power
8
of the trustee to avoid preference.
Under section 547(b), the trustee in bankruptcy may avoid
transfers of property made by the insolvent debtor to or for the

4. See infra note 114.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1988).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979).
7. See generally 9A Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 534 (1980).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1986):

Section 547. Preferences
(b)

the trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor-

(1)

to or for the benefit of a creditor;

(2)

for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer

was made;
(3)
(4)

made
made
(A)
(B)

while the debtor was insolvent;
on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition,

if such creditor, at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
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benefit of a creditor for an antecedent debt. This avoidance includes transfers made for a certain period of time prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. The length of that period of time
is prescribed in section 547(b)(4). For all creditors, transfers made
to them, or for their benefit, are avoidable up to ninety days prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, any transfer made
within this period to any creditor is avoided as a preference. However, in the case of a transfer made to, or for the benefit of, an
insider creditor, 9 the preference period is one year. Therefore, all
transfers made to or for the benefit of insider creditors are avoided
for one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Combining the Code's definition above of a creditor and its
characterization in section 101(30)10 of an insider produces a meaning for the term "insider creditor." Under section 101(30), an insider is essentially someone who is intimately involved in the affairs
of the debtor. For example, if the debtor is an individual, section
101(30)(A) says that an insider can be a relative, partner or partnership in which the debtor is a member, or a corporation of which
the debtor is an officer, director or otherwise in control. Similar
provision is made for a partnership debtor under section 101(30)(C).

(5)

that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if
(A)
(B)
(C)

the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title [the Bankruptcy Code];
the transfer had not been made; and
such creditor recieved payment of such debt to the extent provided by
the provisions of this title.
While not directly relevant to this Note, one should be aware that the Code provides for certain
"defenses" to the finding of a preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1987); see also infra note 76.
9. This clause was modified in 1984. The following language was removed: "was an insider;
and ... had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer
....

"

Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982) with 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. 1984).

10. U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988).
The Code at § 101(30) defines an "insider" as:
(A) if the debtor is an individual (i)
relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii)
partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(B)
if the debtor is a corporation (i)
director of the debtor;
(ii)
officer of the debtor;

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/10
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It says that an insider to a partnership can be a partner, relative
of a partner, or a person in control of the debtor.
Most important to the topic in this Note is the definition of
an insider to a corporation given in section 101(30)(B). Under this
section, an insider to a corporate debtor is a director, officer,
person in control or partner or relative of a director, officer or
person in control of the corporate entity.
Having now defined creditor, insider creditor, preference, and
avoidance of a preference, it is necessary to look to section 550
of the Code (entitled "Liability of transferee of avoided transfer")
to determine from whom a preference is recovered." One must
keep in mind that section 547 simply characterizes a transfer as
preferential and thus void, and it is section 550 which allows for
the recovery of the avoided transfer.
Under section 550(a), the trustee may recover an avoided property transfer, or its value, from either the initial transferee or the
entity for whose benefit the transfer was made. If necessary, the
trustee may also recover avoided transfers from the immediate or

(C)

(iii)

person in control of the debtor;

(iv)

partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(v)
(vi)
if the
(i)

general partner of the debtor; or
relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
debtor is a partnership general partner of the debtor;

(ii)
(iii)

relaive of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control of the
debtor;
partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

(iv)

genernal partner of the debtor; or

(v)

person in control of the debtor;

11. U.S.C. § 550(a), (c).
Section 550. Liability of transferee of avoided transfer.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover,
for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the

value of such property, from (1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(c) The trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under subsection (a) of this section.
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mediate transferee of the initial transferee. It should also be noted
that section 550(c) allows only one recovery from among these
parties.
It is the interaction of sections 101(30), 547, and 550 of the
Code which has been used to grant insider preference recovery
against non-insider creditors. If the problem still seems unclear,
that is not surprising. The express language of the Code does not
directly state the principle in question. Insider preference recovery
against non-insider creditors came about as a result of judicial
construction of the above Code provisions.
B. Example: The Deprizio Case
An illustrative case can be used to explicate the problem at
issue in this Note. The case which has been selected for this purpose is often cited as the principle case on point, Levit v. Ingersoll
Rand Financial Corp.12 (In re V.N. Deprizio Construction Co.;
this case is known popularly as "Deprizio").
The Deprizio case involved an individual named Richard Deprizio. 13 He had various business arrangements which required the
making of loans, in which his company borrowed from various
sources and Mr. Deprizio and his two brothers guaranteed the
otherwise unsecured loans.14 Nothing beyond these facts was known
about these loan arrangements. 15
The Deprizio Company had borrowed money on numerous occasions from several lenders, including Ingersoll Rand Financial
Corp.' 6 In each case, Richard Deprizio and/or his brothers guar12. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
13. Id. at 1187.
14. Id.

15. Id. As an aside, Mr. Deprizio had some questionable connections with the administration
of Mayor Jane Byrne in.Chicago. In the 1983 mayoral race, Mr. Deprizio and his company were
apparently approached by the Byrne administration about some construction, the purpose of which
was to bolster the mayor's re-election chances. The result of this proposal was a series of loans
to Deprizio Co. all of which found Mr. Deprizio guaranteeing them and a donation of $3,000
from Deprizio Co. to the mayor's campaign. Subsequently, the United States Attorney opened
an investigation of Mr. Deprizio and his business. Apparently someone was apprehensive about
some information Mr. Deprizio held. Mr. Deprizio was assasinated in January 1986.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/10
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anteed the loans.1 7 Although not stated in the opinion, it is apparent that Deprizio Company had been making payments on these
loans right up to the point at which the bankruptcy petition was
filed, i.e. to well within ninety days of the filing.18
Upon these facts, the court accepted the trustee's argument that
payments in satisfaction of Deprizio Co.'s obligation to the lender
made up to one year prior to the filing of the petition for bankruptcy were avoidable and could be recovered from the lender by
the trustee.1 9 The manner in which the Code sections are weaved
together to achieve this result is best presented in the court's summary of the Trustee's argument:
Suppose Firm borrows money from Lender, with payment guaranteed by Firm's
officer (Guarantor). Section 101(30)(B)(ii) renders Guarantor an "insider."
Guarantor is not Firm's creditor in the colloquial sense but under § 101 of
the Code any person with a "claim" against Firm is a "creditor," and anyone
with a contingent right to payment holds a "claim" under § 101(4)(A). A
guarantor has a contingent right to payment from the debtor: if Lender collects
from Guarantor, Guarantor succeeds to Lender's entitlements and can collect
from Firm. So Guarantor is a "creditor" in Firm's bankruptcy. A payment
("transfer") by Firm to Lender is "for the benefit of" Guarantor under §
547(b)(1) because every reduction in the debt to Lender reduces Guarantor's
exposure. Because the payment to Lender assists Guarantor, it is avoidable
under § 547(b)(4)(B) unless one of the exemptions in § 547(c) applies. Once
the transfer is avoided under 547, the Trustee turns to § 550 for authority to
20
recover.

The court then goes on to point out that under section 550(a)

the trustee has the option of recovering from either the lender or
the guarantor, subject only to the proviso in section 550(c) that
21
there shall be only one recovery.
Of course, if it is not already clear, the nonstatutory aspect of
this problem is the contingent claim the Guarantor has against the
22
Firm by way of subrogation.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 1200-01.
20. Id. at 1190.
21. Id.
22. See,
e.g.,Research
Patne v. Repository
Oliver, 96 Ga.
App. 1991
644, 648-49, 101 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1957).
Disseminated
by The
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This discussion of the Deprizio case is meant to describe how
the court arrived at this recovery. The rationale for this holding,
along with other decisions supporting it, will be discussed at length
next in Section III.
III.

A.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE DEPRIZIO INTERPRETATION

23

Policy

Several courts have justified the Deprizio interpretation on
grounds of policy. In fact, the Deprizio case engages in an extensive discussion of policy reasons for recovery against lenders
for preferences to insider guarantors.2
The Deprizio court noted that the purpose of the preference
rules was to prevent the occurrence of asset-grabbing. 25 When it
becomes apparent prior to bankruptcy that an entity simply does
not have adequate assets to satisfy all its obligations, there is an
incentive to favor those creditors whom, for whatever reason, the
entity most wishes to satisfy. 26 Those preferred creditors are thus
unfairly advantaged in the satisfaction of debts owed to them by
the debtor over those creditors to whom the entity did not choose
to make a preferential payment. 27 The assumption behind this is
that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; an intact debtor
being liquidated as a whole is likely to be more valuable than the
liquidation of its individual parts. 28 In addition, all creditors are
treated alike, and thus, presumably, fairly, by joining in the collective proceeding29 rather than picking away at the entity individually like vultures in the wild.
The extended preference period for insiders is commensurate
to the knowledge they can be assumed to possess.30 They are more
23. See also infra notes 84-90, 96-102 and accompanying text.
24. E.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
25. Id. at 1194.
26. Id. at 1195.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1194.
29. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/10
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likely to know farther in advance than other creditors that the
entity is likely to enter bankruptcy proceedings. 3 1 Thus, payments
made to or for the benefit of insiders are avoidable for up to one
year rather than for only ninety days.3 2 In a situation where an
insider is the guarantor of a debt held by the entity, it is not
surprising to expect the occurrence of a preference. The insider/
33
guarantor is going to be personally liable if the debtor defaults.
Information to which such an individual is likely to be privy would
certainly make him or her sufficiently nervous to influence the
34
debtor to discharge the debt in the face of impending bankruptcy.
Thus, an extended recovery period provides a disincentive against
the preference.3 5 If the payment is made, then the trustee may
recover it either from the creditor or the guarantor. The Deprizio
court noted that this result is consistent with the structure and
36
purposes of the Code.
The defendants in Deprizio argued that the court's holding
would put creditors on guard and give them incentive to precipitate
bankruptcy proceedings at the least sign of trouble.3 7 This in turn
would lessen the potential for a "workout," e.g., a negotiated
restructuring of debt.38 The court's response to this argument was
that it doubted that workouts were economically superior to bankruptcy proceedings and thus not desirable enough to discard the
39
holding.
Also looking to the policies behind the Deprizio principle, the
Bankruptcy Court in In re CoastalPetroleum Corp. addressed concerns about the vulnerability of creditors with the statement that,
"[a]ny failure of the creditor to adequately investigate the credit
worthiness of the debtor or its insider guarantors should not be
viewed as a statutory deficiency but, rather, as an inherent business
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
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risk." 40 The court went on to point out the very salient point that
the creditor had an action against the guarantor for the obligation
of the debtor as well as the avoided payments . 4 l The court did
not, however, consider the possibility of a judgment-proof guarantor.
B.

Statutory Language

The Deprizio case itself and most cases in accord with it make
use of the language of the Bankruptcy Code itself to justify the
result. 42 The Deprizio case states that the language of the Code
requires that the transfers to non-insider creditors be avoided as
preferences.4 3 However, courts which rely heavily or solely on the
language of the Code tend to gloss over the findings of a preference and treat it as a given." They instead address themselves
to the recovery aspect of the proceeding. Indeed, it is acknowledged that there is a distinction made in the Code between a finding that a transfer is preferential, and thus avoided, and the
recovery of that transfer by the trustee. There are, in effect, two
separate activities as well as two separate statutes involved in the
recovery of a preference. First, there is a finding that a transfer
is indeed avoided as a preference under section 547 .41 Then, a
recovery is made by the trustee on the basis of section 550.46 As
stated above, the courts which have concentrated on the language
of the Code have done so in reference to the recovery phase.
The key language in that phase of the proceeding is the provision in section 550(a) that recovery may be had from "the initial
transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made." 47 Courts have found this language by itself
to be quite compelling. In In re Big Three TransportationInc. ,48
40. In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr. 35, 37 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio (1988)..
41. Id.
42. E.g., 874 F.2d at 1190.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., In re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1990).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 550.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).
48. In re Big Three Transportation, Inc., 41 Bankr. 16, 21 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/10
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the Bankruptcy Court, in allowing insider preference recovery
against non-insider creditors, stated, "[t]his Court . . refuses to
overlook the unambiguous language of 11 U.S.C. section
550(a)(2) ....
The language is susceptible of no other interpretation than the result reached herein." ' 49 Similar language is found
in the case of In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.50 In holding that
recovery could be had from the non-insider creditor for transfers
made more that ninety days prior to filing, the court cited section
550(a) and said that its language was "clear to state that recovery
may be had from the initial transferee ....
That language is not
5'
unconditional."1
also
is
but
only unambiguous
Although this section deals with statutory arguments in favor
of the Deprizio interpretation, one case has relied on statutory
provisions to reach a result contrary to Deprizio. In In the Matter
of the Midwestern Companies,52 the bankruptcy court heard the
trustee argue that recovery should be had against the non-insider
and based his argument on Deprizio, Big Three, and Coastal Petroleum. 3 The court stated that regardless of the clarity of the
Code language, standard canons of statutory construction prevented such a recovery.5 4 The Court elaborated:
One statute, if possible, should not be construed to rescind all or part of
another and, in statutory as well as other construction, the specific controls
over the general. Accordingly, the specific provisions in § 547 against recovery
from a non-insider recipient of a transfer more than 90 days before bankruptcy
cannot be overruled by the general provisions of § 550(a)(1). Rather, under
these standard canons of construction, the "initial transferee" provision of
the latter section must be read to include only "initial transferees" who have
received transfers which are prohibited preferences as to them. 5

Thus, the language of the Code has been used on both sides
of the issue. But it has been used more often to extend the period

49. Id. at 20-21.
50. In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
51. Id. at 38.
52. In the Matter of the Midwestern Companies, 96 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988),
aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
53. Id.at 225.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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for recovery of preferences from non-insiders rather than to pro56
tect them.
C.

CongressionalIntent

When approving arguments in favor of the Deprizio interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, several courts have relied on the
intent of Congress, or what they estimate to be the intent of Congress. Indeed, courts have recognized the dearth of legislative history behind the Code provisions relevant to the Deprizio
57
interpretation.
One case in this area which relied heavily on the scant legislative
history of the these Code provisions is In re Robinson Brothers
Drilling, Inc. 58 This case involved the classic scenario, with the
insider guarantying a loan and the debtor making payments within
one year prior to the filing of the petition.5 9 In its thorough discussion of the entire topic, the United States District Court first
examined the issue of whether the insider guarantor was a creditor
by making use of an excerpt from the history of 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(9)(A) which defined "creditor." 6 The court noted that Congress had stated, "[a] guarantor of or surety for a claim against
the debtor will also be a creditor, because he will hold a contingent
claim against the debtor that will become fixed when he pays the
creditor whose claim he has guaranteed or insured." ' 6' This court
and others have found this passage persuasive evidence of Congress's intent that a guarantor should be a creditor. 62 The remainder of the references to legislative intent in the Robinson

56. Midwestern is perhaps the only case in which statutory construction has been used to
protect creditors.
57. See, e.g., In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr. 35, 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
58. In re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc., 97 Bankr. 77 (W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd, 892
F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).

59. Id.at 78.
60. Id. at 80.
61. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309-10 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978)).
62. E.g. In the Matter of R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr. 888, 892 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1983).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/10
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Brothers case refer to the "initial transferee" language in section
550(a)(1).
The court discussed arguments made by the parties that this
section was not intended to allow recovery of voided transfers to
non-insiders, 63 but found them unpersuasive. 64 The court stated
that it favored a literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code as
enacted which reflects the clear intent of Congress .65 In its conclusion, the court in Robinson Brothers stated, "With plain language, Congress developed this hard and fast rule to help prevent
litigation over the issue of bad faith preferential payments by debtors. ' ' 66 Other courts have followed this approach.
The Arkansas Bankruptcy Court in In re Big Three
Transportation67 agreed, noting that if initial transferees were not
intended to be subject to preference recovery, that language could
easily have been omitted by Congress.68 Similarly, the Bankruptcy
Court in In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.69 came to the conclusion
that if there was no significant legislative history on section
550(a)(1), and subsequent changes in the Code had left that provision unchanged, then Congress must have meant for its literal
meaning to be the correct one. 70
This lack of substantive legislative history on section 550(a)(1)
led at least one court in an opposite direction. In In re Cove Patio
Corp.,71 the court, without citing authority, held that section
550(a)(1) was not meant to be interpreted literally so as to expand
to non-insiders the insider preference recovery powers of the trustee.7 2 It was instead meant merely to facilitate the existing recovery

63. In re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc., 97 Bankr. 77, 79 (W.D. Okla. 1988) aff'd 892
F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
64. Id. at 82-3.
65. Id. at 82.

66. Id. at 83.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

In re Big Three Transportation, Inc., 41 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
Id. at 21.
In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
Id. at 38.
In re Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).

72. Id. at 844.
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powers of the trustee. 73 As noted in the introduction to this Note,
this was, at least at one time, the prevailing attitude among the
bankruptcy community.
One final case of note on the subject of legislative intent is In
the Matter of R. A. Beck Builder.7 4 The defendant lenders in that
case argued the defenses to preference avoidance 75 in section
547(c)(2), which provides:
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms; . .76

If these conditions are met, then the trustee may not avoid the
transfer. 7 The defendants in R. A. Beck argued that a new debt
was formed each time a payment on a loan was due and so long
as the payment was made within forty-five days of the point at
which the payment came due and otherwise complied with section
547(c)(2), then these monthly payments on loans were excepted
from avoidance. 78 The court rejected this argument stating that
Congress did not intend such an interpretation of the Code and
that the debt is incurred upon execution of the note, not when
79
each payment comes due.
While arguments in favor of insider preference recovery against
non-insider creditors are persuasive, the arguments against this interpretation are also weighty.

73. Id.
74. In the Matter of R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
75. Id. at 892.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1987). It should be noted that this section has been amended
since Beck. The "forty-five-day rule" no longer applies.
77. Id.
78. 34 Bankr. at 892.
79. Id. at 893.
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s°
AGAINST THE DEPRIzio INTERPRETATION

Appeals to Equity

The majority of courts addressing the topic of insider preference recovery against non-insider creditors have discussed appeals to equity. This is not surprising. Certainly, the least culpable
party in the scenario is being penalized the most. The debtor is,
for whatever reason, insolvent and unable to meet its responsibilities. The guarantor is presumed to be the culprit in a transaction designed to cheat other creditors. The bank merely receives
payment in satisfaction of a debt owed to it. The situation, at
least on the surface, has an unfair flavor to it.
Collier On Bankruptcy is in accord with this notion. Its passage
on the subject provides in pertinent part:
In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a) would permit the
trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and deserves
protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should use its equitable
8
powers to prevent an inequitable result. '

The majority of bankruptcy courts addressing the issue have
agreed either explicitly or implicitly with Collier.s2 This attitude
was best summed up in the language of In the Matter of the Mid-

western Companies Inc.:
Further, the abhorrence of avoiding a transfer with respect to a non-insider
as to whom it is not preferential is so great that, apart from principles of
statutory construction, it has long been recognized that a preference action is
a creature of equity and that the bankruptcy courts, in employing the doctrine,
are to apply equitable principles. The case decisions which have held that re-

80. See also supra notes 52-56, 71-73 and accompanying text.
81. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 550.02, at 550-58 (15th ed. 1985).
82. In the Matter of the Midwestern Companies, Inc., 96 Bankr. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989); in re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc., 96 Bankr.
77, 80 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); in re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1985); In the Matter of R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr. 888, 894 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983);
in re Church Buildings and Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr. 128, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981). See
in re Harbour, 845 F.2d 1254, 1256 n.2, 1257 (4th Cir. 1988); in re Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr.
843, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). The Fourth Circuit in the Harbourcase implied that it approved
of the use of equitable powers in such cases as R.A. Beck Builder. If this is truly their meaning,
this court is the only circuit on that side of the issue.
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covery cannot be had against a bank in circumstances such as those at bar
have simply seized upon the obvious unfairness and inequity of permitting the
trustee to recover under such circumstances. 83

In general, then, bankruptcy courts view such a recovery as
inequitable.
There have, however, been formidable challenges to this use
of a bankruptcy court's equitable powers. The Deprizio case addressed this issue and found, as have other courts deciding the
equity issue in the same manner, 4 that when dealing with explicit
statutory language, bankruptcy courts may not invoke equity powers.8s Other courts fail to see the equity in the situation because
the lender has an action against the guarantor for any loss incurred
8 6
on the obligation.
The Deprizio court took the argument against the use of equity
one step further and mixed it with economic reasoning. 87 The court
noted that if the extended preference period facilitated bankruptcy
as a debt-adjustment process, then credit, in the aggregate would
become available on slightly better terms.88 If the extended period
had the opposite effect, credit would be slightly more expensive
and monitoring of creditors more stringent. 89 The court acknowledged that either result was possible, but concluded that even if
the interest rate were raised slightly by the rule, "inefficiency is
not inequitable. "90 This argument, however, seems to commit the
"strawman fallacy" in that those who argue equity in opposition
to recovery from non-insider creditors do not find market reactions

83. 96 Bankr. at 225.
84. In re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1990); in re Coastal Petroleum
Corp., 91 Bankr. 35, 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). See in re Big Three Transportation,Inc., 41

Bankr. 16, 20-1 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
85. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1197 (7th Cir. 1989).
86. Bonded Financial Services v. European Amer. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 1988);
in re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc., 97 Bankr. 77, 81 (W.D. Okla. 1988).

87. 874 F.2d at 1198.
88. Id. Further explanation of the court's reasoning may be in order. Debt-adjustment represents a certain cost to the lending industry. Costs to the industry show up in the price of its
money, the interest rate. Thus, if the debt-adjustment process is changed such that it is somewhat

less costly, this will translate into a slight decrease in interest rates.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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inequitable but instead the unfairness of recovering from the least
culpable party in the transaction. Other arguments besides equity
have also been advanced to attack insider preference recovery
against non-insider creditors.

B.

"Two-Transfer" Theory

One fairly creative attempt to circumvent insider preference recovery against non-insider creditors is what has become known as
the "two transfer" theory. The two transfer theory focuses on the
payment itself and splits it into two transfers. 91 The first is a transfer to the creditor, which, of course, is in the form of cash value. 92
The second transfer is the benefit received by the insider guarantor
when its obligation is lessened by the amount of the payment.9 3
The second transfer, being to an insider, is avoidable up to one
year prior to filing.9 4 The first transfer, as one to a non-insider,
95
is only avoidable if it is within ninety days of filing.
The "two-transfer" theory has, however, met strong opposition. The court in Deprizio dismissed the theory as an incorrect
interpretation of the definition of "transfer" according to the
Code.9 6 Noting that the theory equates "transfer" with benefits
received, the court concluded that a transfer was actually a payment made. 97 Thus, the court concluded that "[a] single payment
98
... is one 'transfer,' no matter how many persons gain thereby."
99 concurred with the Deprizio
The Sixth Circuit in C-L Cartage
approach to the two-transfer theory. 1°° They also saw the payment

91. In re Mercon Industries, Inc., 37 Bankr. 549, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1195-96 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 1196.
In re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1495.
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as one transfer, but in addition criticized the two-transfer theory
as a "tortured construction of the statute."''1
Similarly, the United States District Court in Robinson Brothers rejected the two-transfer theory as "result-oriented."1 0 2 Beyond
the two-transfer theory argument against insider preference recovery from non-insider creditors lie policy considerations.
C. Policy
The principle policy argument against the Deprizio principle is
0 3
best stated by Collier on Bankruptcy:
if a transfer is made to a creditor who is not an insider more than 90 days
but within one year before bankruptcy and the effect is to prefer an insiderguarantor, recovery should be restricted to the guarantor and the creditor should
be protected. Otherwise, a creditor who does not demand a guarantorcan be
better off than one who does."'°

Indeed, it is not difficult to understand why a creditor might
be hesitant to enter into such a loan arrangement when it may
subject to this extended window of recovery. The incentives created
by the Deprizio interpretation could potentially make credit somewhat more difficult to obtain. Courts which, have rejected this
argument have tended to ignore it on its own merits and reject it
as part of an overall rejection of an equity argument.
V.

METHODS OF AVOIDING THE DEPRiZIO PROBLEM

While the principle set forth in the Deprizio case, and others
like it, is by no means set in the concrete of case law, it is none101. Id.
102. In re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc., 97 Bankr. 77, 82 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
103. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 550.02, at 550-58 (15th ed. 1985). See also In the Matter
of the Midwestern Companies, Inc., 96 Bankr. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102
Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989); in re T.B. Westex Foods, 96 Bankr. 77, 81 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989); in re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc., 8 B.C.D. 1180, 1183 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); in re
Church Buildings and Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr. 128, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981). See in re
Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 81-2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); in re Cove Patio Corp., 19
Bankr. 843, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). But see in re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490, 149495 (6th Cir. 1990); Bonded Financial Services v. European Amer. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 894-95
(7th Cir. 1988); in re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr. 35, 37-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988);
in re Big Three Transportation,Inc., 41 Bankr. 16, 20-1 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
104. (Emphasis added); see, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186,
1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
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theless a problem that the banking industry must address or face
more unexpected recoveries by bankruptcy trustees. This section
proposes a few possible means by which avoidance of transfers in
these situations could be limited or eliminated.
A.

05
Waiving Subrogation Rights of the Guarantor'

Generally speaking, if a debtor defaults on a loan and the guarantor is forced to fulfill the debtor's obligations, then the guarantor will have an action against the debtor by way of
subrogation.10 6 This is the so-called "claim" against the debtor
that purportedly makes the guarantor a creditor of the debtor.
If the guarantor were to waive this right of subrogation against
the debtor, then the claim would no longer exist and the guarantor
would no longer be a creditor. Thus, if a transfer were made from
the debtor to the creditor less then one year but more than ninety
days prior to bankruptcy, there would be no insider creditor to
be preferred by the payment.
Of course, the problem created is that the guarantor will no
longer have a remedy in the event that the debtor defaults and
the guarantor is forced to make good its pledge. While this exposure is troublesome, it is not significant. After all, if the debtor
had such limited remaining resources that it was forced to default
on the loan, what are the chances the debtor will be able to satisfy
a judgment against it for the same amount? It seems as though
the guarantor gives up little by waiving subrogation rights.
B.

GuarantorEndorsements

The case of Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re C-L
Cartage)10 7 suggested yet another solution to the Deprizio problem

105. There is now doubt in the bankruptcy community about the effectiveness of the waiver
of subrogation rights. It has been noted that such an arrangement only increases the incentive
for the insider guarantor to act in such a way as to subvert the bankruptcy process. Borowitz,
Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. Law.
2151 (1990).
106. See supra note 22.
107. 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990).
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for bankers. In that case, some of the payments in the insider
preference period of one year were not paid directly to the
creditor. 08 Instead, the payments were made from the debtor to
the guarantor and the checks then endorsed to the creditor by the
guarantor.10 9 In remanding the case to district court, the court
stated, "As a mediate transferee within section 550(a)(2), the bank
may be able to claim the benefit of section 550(b)(1) defenses." 10
Section 550(b)(1) provides, "The trustee may not recover under
section (a)(2) of this section from (1) a transferee that takes for
value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent
debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of
the transfer avoided; ....

511

By the language of the statute, then, two elements are required
to claim section 550(b)(1) defenses, good faith lack of knowledge
that the transfer is avoidable." 2 In the Deprizio scenario, it seems
unlikely that a creditor, by definition a non-insider, will know
prior to ninety days before bankruptcy that a transfer will be
avoided as a preference. Non-insider creditors in general are not
imputed by the Code to have such knowledge until ninety or fewer
days prior to bankruptcy."3 Thus, the knowledge requirement seems
easily fulfilled.
"Good faith" is a much more troubling term. It is not defined
by the Code. Thus, it is an amorphous example of weasel words
which lay the entire matter in the hands of the court. Perhaps the
answer to this problem is standardization of a provision in loans
which requires the guarantor endorsement for all payments made
by all otherwise unsecured debtors. Such a "boilerplate" provision
would remove as much as possible the appearance of attempting
to avoid preference liability. Whether this would be interpreted by
a court as "good faith" is, however, beyond accurate prediction.

108. Id. at 1495.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1).
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A).
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The key advantage to the guarantor endorsement scheme is that
no new exposure is placed on anyone. All the parties' rights remain
intact. There is, of course, no advantage to the guarantor since
it will still be liable as an insider for preference recovery just as
it was in the Deprizio case. And there are generally higher transaction costs because of the trouble which must be taken to have
the guarantor endorse each payment. But the non-insider creditor
would be insulated from insider preference liability.
C. A Legislative Proposal
The most frequent first reaction which this Note's author has
encountered to the Deprizio interpretation is "isn't the guarantor's
claim only contingent?" Indeed, it seems to be a bit of a legal
stretch to take this contingent claim and make the guarantor a
creditor as a result thereof. However, it cannot be disputed that
the Code definition of a claim includes those which are contin114
gent.
The Deprizio problem could thus be solved by an amendment
to the Bankruptcy Code which removes the word "contingent"
from the definition of a claim. The guarantor's contingent claim
against the debtor would thus no longer be a claim under the Code
and the insider guarantor would no longer be a creditor.
There are two costs involved with this solution. First, there
would be the cost of pushing legislation through Congress. Of
course, it comes as no surprise in 1991 that the banking industry
is, at least for the time being, financially able to effectively influence Congress. Second, there would inevitably be, in the infinite
transactions which occur in the business world, situations in which
contingent claims should, by the spirit and policies of the Code,
be included as claims under the Code. Obviously there will be
occasions when a transfer could be recovered otherwise but for
the removal of the word "contingent" from the Code. Whether

114. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) states that a claim means, " .

.

. a right to payment, whether

or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured .... (Emphasis added). See also 11
U.S.C. § 1O1(4)(B).
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this hindrance of the bankruptcy process is insignificant enough
to justify this amendment is a question left for another time.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Note is meant, first, as an overview of the Deprizio case
and its ramifications, and, second, as a search for an effective
means by which a lending institution may avoid liability under this
case. If a lender sets up a loan in which the debtor is unsecured
and a guarantor co-signs who is an insider to the debtor, the lender
may be subject to an extended preference period for transfers made
to the lender in satisfaction of the debt even though the lender is
not an insider.
There has been considerable debate over this principle. Bankruptcy courts have been less willing to accept this idea and reject
it frequently on equitable grounds. On the other hand, the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal which have addressed the issue have favored the extended recovery. Only the Fourth Circuit has hinted
otherwise. "1 5 Thus, any lender stands such a significantly high
chance of being subject to a Deprizio recovery in a bankruptcy
proceeding that precautions are wise.
The bottom line message to lenders sent by the Deprizio court,
and others which have ruled likewise, is beware the unsecured loan
guaranteed by an insider. There is thus an incentive to look very
carefully at the guarantor and its financial health, because the
lender has recourse to no other party in the event of such a preference recovery.
Thomas Johnston

115. In re Harbour, 845 F.2d 1254, 1256-58 (4th Cir. 1988); see also supra note 82.
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